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Executive control can be driven by conscious and unconscious monetary cues. This
has raised the exciting question regarding the role of conscious and unconscious
reward in the regulation of executive control. Similarities and differences have been
uncovered between unconscious and conscious processing of monetary rewards. In
the present study, we explored whether individual differences associated with reward
sensitivity foster these variations on memory-updating—a core component process of
executive control. Participants (N = 60) with low, medium, and high reward sensitivity
were selected and performed a numerical memory-updating task. At the beginning of
each trial, a high (1 euro) or a low (5 cents) reward was presented subliminally (24 ms)
or supraliminally (300 ms). Participants earned the reward by responding correctly.
Participants with low reward sensitivity performed better for the high reward only in
the subliminal condition. For participants with medium reward sensitivity, performance
improved with high reward in both subliminal and supraliminal conditions. When
participants had high reward sensitivity scores, the effect of reward was stronger in
the supraliminal condition than the subliminal condition. These results show that the
distinctive effects of conscious and unconscious rewards on executive performance are
modulated by individual differences in reward sensitivity. We discuss this finding with
reference to models of conscious/unconscious processing of reward stimuli.
Keywords: reward, conscious and unconscious processes, behavioral activation, individual differences, executive
control, memory-updating
INTRODUCTION
Executive control has been defined as “the ability to flexibly and dynamically adjust one’s
performance to changing environmental demands and internal goal states” (Barch et al., 2009). This
ability has been strongly linked to consciousness. However, several studies have reported effects of
subliminal stimuli on high-order executive control processes (van Gaal et al., 2012). For instance,
studies have suggested that conscious but also unconscious processing of monetary reward can
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increase performance in tasks requiring executive control (Capa
et al., 2011, 2013; Bustin et al., 2012). This has raised the exciting
question of the role of conscious and unconscious processing
reward in executive control. However, differences have been
uncovered between conscious and unconscious reward. In the
present study, we explored whether the behavioral activation
system – a motivational system responsible for organizing and
regulating behavior to attain rewards (Gray, 1989) – may be a
crucial factor to explain differences in executive performance
(memory-updating) between conscious and unconscious reward
processing.
Initial empirical evidence of the influence of unconscious
reward processing was provided by Pessiglione et al. (2007),
who invited participants to perform a task in which they
could earn money by squeezing a handgrip. Participants put
in more effort for larger sums of money displayed subliminally
and supraliminally. Moreover, the same basal forebrain region
was involved in both subliminal and supraliminal rewards
presentation, which suggests that the cerebral structures involved
in both conditions were qualitatively similar. This influential
study was replicated and extended to various cognitive tasks
(Bijleveld et al., 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a; Capa et al., 2011, 2013;
Zedelius et al., 2011, 2012a,b, 2013, 2014; Bustin et al., 2012).
Among these studies, several showed that even performance
in complex tasks involving high-order processes, traditionally
thought to require consciousness, can be driven by both
conscious and unconscious rewards. For instance, Bijleveld et al.
(2010) invited participants to perform a task in which they could
earn money by quickly and accurately solving a mathematical
equation. The amount of money that participants received
was contingent on their speed and accuracy. The possibility
of speed-accuracy trade-off thus allowed participants to make
strategic choices. In other words, participants could choose
between using a rapid strategy or a cautious one. Subliminal
high rewards made participants more eager, with faster but
equally accurate responses. Supraliminal high rewards, on the
other hand, caused participants to be more cautious, with slower
but more accurate responses. Interestingly, other studies also
reported differences between conscious and unconscious rewards
for tasks requiring executive control such as memory-updating
(Capa et al., 2011; Bustin et al., 2012) and task-switching (Capa
et al., 2013).
In a previous study (Capa et al., 2011), we sought to investigate
the influence of conscious and unconscious rewards on memory-
updating. Participants had to memorize five numbers and
update those numbers independently according to a series of six
successive arithmetic operations. At the beginning of each trial,
a reward (1 euro or 5 cents) was presented either subliminally
(27 ms) or supraliminally (300 ms). If participants successfully
reported the final correct series of numbers, then they earned
the reward at stake. Results showed better performance when
a high monetary reward (either consciously or unconsciously
processed) was at stake. However, the participants showed a
better percentage of correct responses when subliminal reward
cues were presented compared to supraliminal cues.
In another study, we tested the influence of conscious and
unconscious rewards during cued task-switching performance
(Capa et al., 2013). In this study, participants performed runs
of task-switching. During each run, participants switched among
three tasks and earned the reward contingent upon their accuracy
in the run. The percentage of correct runs was larger for
the higher than for the lower reward, in both subliminal and
supraliminal conditions. In respect to reaction times, participants
were overall faster for the supraliminal reward. Moreover,
for the subliminal reward, no reaction time difference was
observed between high and low reward conditions suggesting
that participants were more cautious.
Why consciously and unconsciously processed rewards can
differentially affect executive control is open to argument and
the modulating factors of the reward-related effects remain to
be fully understood. In this context, one important – but rather
unexplored – question is whether individuals’ personality traits or
tendencies can modulate these effects on executive performance.
The impact of individual differences on the distinctive effects of
conscious and unconscious rewards is a key issue to investigate to
further our understanding of the regulating role of motivation in
executive control (Braver et al., 2010).
In a first attempt (Bustin et al., 2012), we explored whether
individual differences associated with novelty seeking could
foster differences in the effect of reward processing on executive
function. Novelty seeking is defined as a trait involving activation
or initiation of behaviors such as exploratory activity and
approach to monetary rewards (Cloninger et al., 1993). Within
this frame, participants performed a memory-updating task,
similar to Capa et al. (2011), to earn rewards presented
consciously and unconsciously. On the basis of participants’
scores on the novelty seeking scale from the Temperament
and Character Inventory-Revised (TCI-R; Cloninger, 1999),
two groups (low below the median vs. high above the
median) of participants were created. We found that low
novelty seeking participants performed better when rewards
were presented subliminally, whereas high novelty seeking
participants’ performance did not differ regardless whether
reward cues were processed consciously or unconsciously. These
previous findings highlight the necessity of taking individual
differences into account to better understand the effects of
conscious and unconscious processing reward on executive
control.
To examine further this issue, the present study focused on
reward sensitivity, which is known to be a moderator of reward
processing (Kim et al., 2015). More specifically, we investigated
whether individual differences in reward sensitivity can foster the
distinctive effects of conscious (supraliminal) and. unconscious
(subliminal) processing of reward on executive performance.
Cloninger’s model of personality, which incorporates novelty
seeking tendency (see above), is theoretically related to Gray
(1989) model, which distinguishes between two motivational
systems: the behavioral approach system (BAS) and the
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) (Mardaga and Hansenne,
2007). Hence, the present work was guided by Gray’s model.
Accordingly, the BIS guides’ behavior in response to punishment
signals via the septohippocampal system. The BAS, on the other
hand, may organize and regulate behavior in response to reward
signals via the dopamine system.
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Reward sensitivity is measured using the BIS/BAS scale
developed by Carver and White (1994). The BAS scale consists
of three subdimensions, with two subscales related to reward
processing (BAS Drive and BAS Reward Responsiveness) and
one to novelty-seeking (BAS Fun Seeking). Previous research
has shown that the BAS Drive and BAS Reward Responsiveness
subscales can be used as a reliable index of individual
differences in reward sensitivity (Carver and White, 1994;
Hickey et al., 2010). The BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale
captures positive responses to the occurrence or anticipation of
reward, whereas the BAS Drive subscale indexes the persistent
pursuit of desired rewards. Participants with high, as opposed
to low, BAS Drive scores show correspondingly higher task
engagement to earn a conscious reward during a cognitive task
(Boksem et al., 2006, 2008; Hickey et al., 2010). Similarly, BAS
Reward Responsiveness has been found to correlate positively
with reward-related effects on cognitive processing (Braem
et al., 2012). Differences in BAS scores can thus lead to
differential effects of conscious rewards. To the best of our
knowledge, no studies to date have looked at the impact
of unconscious reward processing as a function of the BAS
system.
In the present study, executive control was probed through a
memory-updating task. Memory-updating is a key component of
executive control. It refers to a process that is required to modify
the content of working memory by replacing current, no longer
relevant information with more relevant information (Morris
and Jones, 1990). Participants were selected with low, medium, or
high scores on the BAS Drive subscale.1 They could earn money
displayed subliminally or supraliminally by performing well
in a numerical memory-updating task. As observed previously
in a similar task (Capa et al., 2011; Bustin et al., 2012), we
anticipated a reward effect, with better performance associated
with the possibility of earning a high reward as opposed to
a low reward. Moreover, we explored whether conscious and
unconscious reward processing differed or not as a function of
the BAS system. We expected an increase in the reward effect
on executive performance concomitant with the increase in BAS
scores.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The French version of the BIS/BAS scales (Carver and White,
1994) was administered to 215 university students (129 female,
86 male) enrolled in an introductory-level psychology course.
Their mean age was 21.18 years (SD = 3.13). Participants were
classified as low BAS if their score (i.e., the sum of the four
items) with the BAS Drive subscale was six or less (below the 15th
percentile), and high BAS if their score was 10 or more (above
1Each of the three BAS subscales can potentially predict reward-related effects
(Hickey et al., 2010; Braem et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we choose to create the
groups of participants on the basis of the BAS Drive subscale, because it has been
found to show the highest construct validity, and it has been suggested to be the
best predictor of reward-induced behavior (Carver and White, 1994; Hickey et al.,
2010; see also Ross et al., 2002).
the 85th percentile).2 Participants who scored 7 or 8 (40th and
60th percentile) were classified as medium BAS (participants with
a score of 9 were excluded). Furthermore, participants in the
low, medium, and high BAS groups were also selected if their
BIS score (i.e., sum of the 7 BIS items) was between 14 and 22
(15th and 85th percentile). This was done to avoid differences in
BIS scores across groups. Participants among this first sample of
those who volunteered to take part in the study had to fill out the
BIS/BAS questionnaire a second time (Carver and White, 1994).
Only participants whose scores stayed within the limits set by the
initial distribution were retained, as an experimental precaution
to ensure their characteristics were stable. Therefore, a total of 60
participants (20 per group) constituted our final sample.
The experiment was conducted in accordance with the
Helsinki Declaration. Each participant read and signed an
informed consent form prior to taking part in the experiment.
They were allowed to keep the money they earned. The
study was of 2 (reward presentation duration: supraliminal
vs. subliminal) × 2 (reward value: low vs. high) × 3 (BAS
group: low vs. medium vs. high) mixed-factorial design. Reward
presentation duration and reward value were within-participants
factors, and BAS group was a between-participant factor.
Experimental Task
The updating task – based on the memory-updating paradigm
devised by Salthouse et al. (1991) – was presented on a 85-Hz CRT
screen. Participants took part in a training session consisting of
eight trials (two trials per condition), followed by 80 experimental
trials (20 repetitions per condition). At the beginning of each
trial, a fixation cross appeared, followed immediately by a pre-
mask, the reward stimulus (presented subliminally for 24 ms3
or supraliminally for 300 ms), and a post-mask (Figure 1A).
Stimuli for the updating task were then presented (Figure 1B).
Participants were instructed that if they responded correctly, they
would receive the reward presented at the beginning of the trial.
They had to memorize five numbers and update each number
independently according to a series of six arithmetical operations
(i.e., additions and subtractions of ±1 or ±2). Intermediate and
end results for each number were always in the range of 0 to 9, to
ensure a constant degree of difficulty.
At the end of the trial, participants were asked to enter the
final value of each number on a keyboard. They were told they
would only win the pecuniary reward if all five numbers were
correct. The five-number sequences they had to memorize, the
six successive updating operations, and the required responses
were all different across trials. This ensured there was no implicit
learning or association possible between the reward stimuli and
the response. Cumulative earnings were displayed at the end of
each trial (Figure 1C). Participants were told that the reward
stimuli were either 1 euro or 5 cents and would sometimes
be difficult to see. This was an experimental precaution which
2These distribution parameters were obtained from our data instead of the original
Carver and White (1994) distribution. This was done because we used the French
version of the BIS/BAS scales and little is currently known about the distribution
of scores on this French version.
3This prime duration was selected to approximate the 27 ms prime duration in
Capa et al. (2011) given our monitor refresh rate (85 Hz).
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FIGURE 1 | Design of the experimental task. A series of screens were displayed during a trial, with durations in milliseconds. At the beginning of each trial (A), a
reward of either 1 euro or 5 cents was shown on the screen, either subliminally (24 ms) or supraliminally (300 ms). To earn the reward, participants had to find the
correct response in the updating task (B). Finally, at the end of each trial (C) participants were informed of their cumulative earnings.
ensured that participants paid attention to the rewards. It
was used because the cognitive processes at work in masked
priming experiments are dependent on attention (Naccache et al.,
2002).
Perceptual Discrimination Task
To ensure that supraliminal reward stimuli were consciously
perceived and subliminal reward stimuli were not, after the
experimental task participants were asked to perform a forced-
choice test. The test consisted of four training trials followed by
80 experimental trials. Each trial consisted of masks and reward
cues (Figure 1A), after which several choices were displayed
simultaneously instead of the experimental task. Participants
were asked to choose one of four responses: “I saw 1 euro,” “I saw
5 cents,” “I guess it was 1 euro,” “I guess it was 5 cents.” There
was no limit to the response time, and the possible responses
remained on the screen until a choice had been made.
Self-Report Data
After the perceptual discrimination task, participants filled out
the French version of the BIS/BAS scales (Carver and White,
1994). The BIS scale consisted of seven items (e.g., “I feel worried
when I think I have done poorly”). The BAS scale, for its part, was
made up of three subscales: Drive (four items, “I go out of my way
to get things I want”), Reward Responsiveness (five items, “When
I get something I want, I feel excited and energized”), and Fun
Seeking (four items, “I crave excitement and new sensations”).
Participants rated their responses on four-point scales ranging
from 1 (totally true) to 4 (totally wrong). In the current study,
Cronbach’s alphas were 0.70 for the BIS scale, 0.71 for Drive,
0.73 for Reward Responsiveness, and 0.69 for Fun Seeking.
Correlations between the BAS subscales ranged from 0.42 to 0.62.
The BIS scale was unrelated to the BAS Reward Responsiveness
and BAS Drive subscales but had a small negative association with
the BAS Fun Seeking subscale (r = −0.21).
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RESULTS
Participant Characteristics
As expected, Student’s t-tests revealed that participants in
the medium BAS group had higher BAS Drive scores than
participants in the low BAS group and lower scores than
participants in the high BAS group [t(38) = 12.52, p < 0.0001,
d = 3.96] and [t(38) = 21.39, p < 0.0001, d = 6.79], respectively.
Student’s t-tests revealed that participants with medium BAS had
higher BAS Reward Responsiveness [t(38) = 3.47, p < 0.001,
d = 1.09], BAS Fun Seeking [t(38) = 2.25, p < 0.03, d = 0.71],
BAS Total [t(38) = 3.29, p < 0.002, d = 1.04] scores than
participants in the low BAS group and also lower BAS Reward
Responsiveness [t(38) = 2.80, p < 0.007, d = 0.89], BAS Fun
Seeking [t(38) = 2.61, p< 0.01, d = 0.82], BAS Total [t(38) = 3.20,
p < 0.003, d = 1.01] scores than participants in the high BAS
group. Analyses of BIS scores revealed no significant difference
between groups (all ps > 0.77). These results reflect a successful
selection of participants. Their characteristics are presented in
Table 1.
Percentage of Correct Responses in the
Updating Task
A three-way ANOVA with reward presentation duration
(subliminal vs. supraliminal) and reward value (1 euro vs.
5 cents) as within-participants factors and BAS group (low
vs. medium vs. high) as between-participants factor was
used to analyze the data. Reward value had a main effect,
with better performance for the high reward (M = 44.00,
SD = 24.79) than the low reward (M = 34.00, SD = 20.98),
F(1,57) = 64.11, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.53, reflecting a generally
successful manipulation of reward. Most interestingly, we found
a significant interaction between reward presentation duration,
reward value, and group, F(2,57) = 8.64, p < 0.005, η2p = 0.23
(Figure 2).
We broke this interaction down by performing three separate
ANOVAs (2 reward presentation duration × 2 reward value)
for each BAS group. In the low BAS group (Figure 2A),
there was a main effect of reward presentation duration,
F(1,19) = 9.42, p < 0.007, η2p = 0.33, with better performance
in the subliminal condition (M = 44.00, SD = 26.57) than
the supraliminal condition (M = 29.00, SD = 13.80). No main
TABLE 1 | Participants’ characteristics.
Low BAS Medium BAS High BAS
Gender (F/M) 11/9 11/9 11/9
Age (M ± SD) 21.27 ± 2.05 21.38 ± 1.52 21.35 ± 1.48
BAS drive (M ± SD) 5.05 ± 0.76 7.60 ± 0.50 11.05 ± 1.00
BAS reward responsiveness
(M ± SD)
7.80 ± 2.84 11.65 ± 4.07 14.05 ± 4.15
BAS fun seeking (M ± SD) 8.25 ± 2.36 9.85 ± 2.13 11.60 ± 2.11
BAS total (M ± SD) 21.10 ± 4.76 29.10 ± 5.49 37.80 ± 4.74
BIS (M ± SD) 16.80 ± 0.73 16.65 ± 1.25 16.75 ± 1.11
BAS, behavioral activation system; BIS, behavioral inhibition system.
effect of reward value was found (p > 0.12), but there was
a significant interaction between reward value and reward
presentation duration, F(1,19) = 6.41, p < 0.02, η2p = 0.25.
The low BAS participants only performed better for the high
reward than the low reward in the subliminal condition.
Complementary Student’s t-tests confirmed that the reward effect
was present only in the subliminal condition, t(19) = 3.21,
p < 0.005, d = 0.70, and not in the supraliminal condition
(p = 0.83).
In the medium BAS group (Figure 2B), there was a main
effect of reward with better performance when a high reward
was at stake (M = 44.67, SD = 22.86) as opposed to a low
reward (M = 34.17, SD = 18.81), F(1,19) = 58.41, p < 0.0001,
η2p = 0.75. This effect was not affected by reward presentation
duration (p = 0.57). To ascertain whether there was a reward
effect in both conditions, complementary Student’s t-tests were
conducted. Participants in the medium BAS group performed
better for the high reward than the low reward, both in the
subliminal condition, t(19) = 3.62, p < 0.002, d = 0.80, and
the supraliminal condition, t(19) = 5.16, p< 0.0001, d = 1.11. The
main effect of reward presentation duration was not significant
(p = 0.21).
In the high BAS group (Figure 2C), the main effect of
reward was significant (1 euro: M = 49.00, SD = 26.65,
and 5 cents: M = 33.17, SD = 23.80), F(1,19) = 35.46,
p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.65. Furthermore, the reward effect was higher
in the supraliminal condition than the subliminal condition,
as suggested by a significant interaction, F(1,19) = 10.70,
p < 0.004, η2p = 0.36. Complementary Student’s t-tests showed
an effect of reward in both conditions of presentation duration,
t(19) = 3.32, p < 0.004, d = 0.75 for the subliminal
condition and t(19) = 5.44, p < 0.0001, d = 1.13 for the
supraliminal condition. No difference in performance was
found between the possibility of earning 5 cents depending
on whether it was displayed subliminally or supraliminally
(p = 0.40). However, high BAS participants performed better
in the subliminal condition in order to win 1 euro than
in the supraliminal condition, t(19) = 2.21, p < 0.04,
d = 0.47.
Complementary Analysis
To gain a better understanding of the effect of individual
differences associated with reward sensitivity for conscious
and unconscious reward processes, we conducted two separate
ANOVAs (2 reward value × 3 group), one for the subliminal
and the other for the supraliminal condition. In the subliminal
condition, no main effect of group or interaction was found (all
ps > 0.81). In the supraliminal condition, the effect of reward
increased with the increase in the BAS scores, as suggested
by a significant interaction between reward value and groups,
F(2,57) = 12.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.31. Complementary Student’s
t-tests showed that the reward effect (difference between 1 euro
and 5 cents) in the medium BAS group (M = 11.67, SD = 10.12)
was greater than that in the low BAS group (M = −0.67,
SD = 14.00), t(38) = 3.19, p < 0.003, d = 0.62, but less than that
in the high BAS group (M = 23.33, SD = 19.16), t(38) = 2.41,
p < 0.02, d = 0.71.
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of correct responses in the memory-updating task as
a function of reward value displayed subliminally and supraliminally and BAS
groups. Low BAS participants (A) performed better for the high reward than
the low reward only in the subliminal condition. In the medium BAS group
(B), there was a main effect of reward, and it was similar in the subliminal and
supraliminal conditions. In the high BAS group (C), the reward effect was
higher in the supraliminal condition than the subliminal condition. Error bars
denote standard errors of the mean. ∗∗p < 0.005, and ns for not significant.
Prime Visibility Test
It was apparent from debriefing participants before the prime
visibility test that none of them was able to report whether 1
euro or 5 cents coins were presented subliminally. We analyzed
the prime visibility test results on the basis of correct responses,
defined as responses indicating the participant had seen or
guessed the right coin. Results of the prime visibility test showed
that the participants had seen the coins in the supraliminal
condition (M = 97.85). However, for the subliminal coins, the
mean percentage of correct responses (M = 50.94, SD = 6.29) was
not significantly different from chance, as suggested by Student’s
t-tests (ps > 0.24). In addition, Student’s t-tests revealed no
difference between groups (ps > 0.72).
DISCUSSION
The present study shows that executive performance associated
with the possibility of earning a high reward improved with the
increase in the BAS scores when the reward was consciously
processed, but not when the reward was subliminally displayed.
In the same way that personality has been shown not only to
attenuate, but even sometimes to eradicate or reverse classic
psychological effects (Matthews, 2009), these results highlight
the need to take into account individual differences in reward
sensitivity when investigating the effects of conscious and
unconscious rewards on executive control.
The current findings echo other studies showing that executive
performance fluctuates and can be modified for example by
affective stimuli (Dreisbach, 2006; Chiew and Braver, 2014).
More specifically, our work is in line with previous research
on the influence of motivation showing that rewards can
improve executive functioning (Bijleveld et al., 2010; Jimura
et al., 2010; Capa et al., 2011, 2013; Bustin et al., 2012;
Chiew and Braver, 2014). Here we found that, overall, high
rewards (compared to low reward) improved memory-updating.
A key finding is that individuals’ reward sensitivity mediated
these reward-related effects on memory-updating (at least when
reward cues were processed consciously). A straightforward
explanation is that in contrast with the high BAS group,
individuals with low sensitivity to rewards should experience
a weaker incentive state when processing the high rewards,
leading to a less improvement in memory-updating relative
to the low reward condition. However, why both conscious
and unconscious rewards improved memory-updating, but only
conscious rewards’ effects depended on individual differences in
reward sensitivity is open to discussion.
A relevant framework for understanding conscious and
unconscious reward processing and its similar or distinctive
effects on performance has been suggested by Bijleveld et al.
(2012b). This model may be useful to understand the variability
of the effects of conscious and unconscious rewards on
memory-updating. Accordingly, people first process rewards in
subcortical brain structures, such as the striatum (Pessiglione
et al., 2008). This initial processing requires little perceptual
input, is not consciously experienced, and can directly facilitate
performance by prompting task engagement in the service of
reward attainment. However, when supraliminal reward cues
are consciously perceived, they may undergo full processing, in
which case, the brain structures mobilized (e.g., anterior cingulate
cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and medial prefrontal
cortex), in addition to the structures already engaged by initial
reward processing, may involve higher-level cognitive functions,
such as strategy (Haber and Knutson, 2009). Thus, full reward
processing may lead individuals to consciously choose a strategy.
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Furthermore, when strategy differences emerge, the effects of
conscious and unconscious reward cues may also differ, with
conscious reward cues either helping or hindering performance.
A good illustration of hindering performance was observed
with the low BAS participants (Figure 2A). They performed
better for the high reward than the low reward, but only in
the subliminal condition. No improvement in performance was
observed for a high reward in the supraliminal condition. The
amount of money at stake in the present study was probably not
challenging enough for the low BAS participants, and conscious
reflection on reward probably led them to disengage from the
pursuit and attainment of reward. This is consistent with the
study of Zedelius et al. (2013) which showed that conscious
reflection on a money cue can cause people to disengage from
attainment of reward. Participants were invited to perform a
working memory task in which money cues (coins) serving as
rewards or not were displayed supraliminally or subliminally.
High money cues led to improved performance even when the
coins did not serve as rewards in the subliminal condition, but not
in the supraliminal condition. This suggests that consciousness
is crucial in regulating effort mobilization toward money cues.
In the medium BAS group (Figure 2B), the effect of reward was
similar in the subliminal and supraliminal conditions, suggesting
that participants in the medium BAS group adopted a similar
level of task engagement toward the pursuit and attainment
of conscious and unconscious rewards. This participant sample
is probably the one most frequently studied, and this result is
in keeping with our previous study (Capa et al., 2011), which
found a reward-related effect in both subliminal and supraliminal
conditions. The high BAS group may be a good illustration
of conscious reward helping performance. For participants in
the high BAS group (Figure 2C), the reward effect was greater
in the supraliminal condition than the subliminal condition.
Consciously reflecting on reward led the high BAS participants to
engage more toward attaining the reward and to perform better.
This fits well with previous studies showing that an increase of
BAS score induced higher task engagement to earn a conscious
reward (Boksem et al., 2006, 2008; Hickey et al., 2010).
The existence of unconscious perception is no longer denied.
Rather, the controversy has shifted to the depth with which
subliminal stimuli can be processed and the limits to unconscious
cognition (van Gaal et al., 2012). These limits are source of
variability between conscious and unconscious reward effects on
executive functions. The present results highlight the limits to the
depth with which unconscious stimuli can be processed. In our
study, there was no difference in performance across BAS groups
when the possibility of winning a large reward was displayed
subliminally, suggesting there was no difference in the strategies
adopted by the groups. Differences in performance across BAS
groups emerged only when the reward was processed consciously,
suggesting that consciousness of reward is crucial to triggering
specific strategies. This result lends support to the theoretical
framework developed by Bijleveld et al. (2012b) which suggests
that full reward processing may cause individuals to choose a
strategy consciously.
Individual differences in reward sensitivity, as indexed
by the BAS scores used in the present study, have been
strongly linked to dopaminergic neurotransmission (Gray, 1989;
Tomer et al., 2014). Interestingly, two recent studies have
investigated whether individual differences in indirect markers
of dopaminergic activity modulate the reward-related effects on
performance in a tapping task (Veling and Bijleveld, 2015) and
a force task (Pas et al., 2014). In both studies, performance
correlated with dopaminergic activity when reward cues were
presented subliminally, but not when reward cues were presented
supraliminally. These results contrast with our finding that
performance was moderated by reward sensitivity only when
reward information was processed consciously. One possible
explanation of these contrasting findings is that the prior
studies and the current work differed in the method employed
to define inter-individual differences. The prior studies used
neurophysiological or behavioral markers of the dopamine
system activity, such as eye blink rate (Pas et al., 2014,
Study 1), error-related negativity (Pas et al., 2014, Study 2) and
performance in the balloon analog risk task (Veling and Bijleveld,
2015). In contrast, we estimated inter-individual differences
using self-report measures. It is possible that the explicit self-
report of sensitivity to reward led participants to act accordingly
when exposed to supraliminal reward cues, hence putting more
effort in the implementation of conscious strategies. However,
this explanation cannot fully account for the present results,
because one can still expect individuals’ trait sensitivity to
reward to modulate the effects of subliminal rewards. Then,
it is noteworthy that the studies by Pas et al. (2014) and
Veling and Bijleveld (2015) involved a tapping task and a
force task, respectively, i.e., tasks that place minimal demand
on executive control resources. In contrast, we specifically
investigated executive performance in a memory-updating task.
Such a focus on executive performance may explain the
specific pattern of results we obtained. One might speculate
that the processing of conscious reward and/or cost-benefit
decisions associated with these rewards (Bijleveld et al., 2010,
2012b), are less resource demanding in individuals with
high (vs. low) reward sensitivity. Hence, processing conscious
reward would be more beneficial for high-BAS individuals
during the performance of a task that requires resource
demanding, cognitive control processes. In contrast, the more
rudimentary unconscious processing of reward would boost
motivation (Bijleveld et al., 2010), hence improving executive
performance, irrespective of individuals’ reward sensitivity. This
interpretation remains, however, speculative and calls for further
research.
Interestingly, it has been suggested recently that working
memory operations are subjectively costly and therefore cost-
benefit decision making would bias the functioning of working
memory (Westbrook and Braver, 2016). Individual differences
in reward/punishment responsiveness may imply differences in
subjective costliness of executive operations and cost-benefit
decisions (Franken and Muris, 2005; Suhr and Tsanadis, 2007).
Hence, a promising line of future research is to examine the
potential relationship between reward responsiveness and cost-
benefit decisions underlying executive functioning, for example
by evaluating the combined effects of task difficulty and reward
as a function of individuals’ BAS/BIS profiles.
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It is worth considering our finding that rewards improved
memory-updating in light of recent neurocognitive models. On
one hand, research demonstrates that reward processing and
motivation are intimately linked to dopamine-related circuitry
(Kim et al., 2015; Westbrook and Braver, 2016). On the
other hand, neurocognitive approaches of executive control
suggest that dopamine activity plays a crucial role in the
maintenance/updating of working memory content (Braver,
2012). Interestingly, a recent framework proposed by Westbrook
and Braver (2016) integrates these two lines of research and
suggests that rewards improve the stability of the content in
working memory through modulating of frontal dopamine
release (Westbrook and Braver, 2016). Importantly, within this
framework, striatal dopamine release mediates the incentive-
induced improvement of the updating of working memory. On
this basis, one might speculate that the improvement in memory-
updating we observed in the high reward condition was related to
reward-induced modifications of striatal dopaminergic activity.
The present results thus highlight the intimate link between
motivation/reward and executive functioning (Pessoa, 2009;
Braver et al., 2010). They further show that this link is shaped
by the BAS/BIS profile of individuals. However, these results
should be considered in light of some limitations. A potentially
important limitation of our study is the small number of
participants in each group, which limits the generalizability of the
findings. Another limitation is that the different groups differed
on the three BAS subscales (Drive, Reward Responsiveness, and
Fun Seeking). Although the groups were defined according to
the Drive subscale, this prevents us to determine which specific
dimension of the BAS was responsible for the observed effects.
However, it is worth to note that the participants were matched
on the BIS component and that the stability of the BAS scores was
verified with two administrations, which are strong points of the
present research.
CONCLUSION
We identified different behavioral responses to consciously vs.
unconsciously processed reward stimuli and have shown that
individual differences in reward sensitivity are a key factor
for explaining variations in executive performance aimed at
reward attainment. We found that the modulatory role of reward
strengthened with the increase in the BAS scores, but only
when the reward was processed consciously. This result suggests
conscious processing of reward is crucial for the existence
of specific strategies pertaining to reward sensitivity in tasks
requiring executive control.
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